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Abstract: For a large class of demand and cost functions, we characterize
the limit equilibrium set under Bertrand oligopoly when entry is exogenous.
Unless average cost is constant, we ﬁnd that the folk theorem of perfect
competition necessarily fails. We also relate our results to those in Novshek
and Roy Chowdhury (2003).
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This paper examines the limit properties of Bertrand price competition when
ﬁrms supply all demand1 and the limiting procedure involves taking the
number of active ﬁrms, exogenously given, to inﬁnity.2
The objective is two-fold. First, we want to characterize the limit equi-
librium set for a general class of demand and cost functions. Second, we
want to examine if, for the Bertrand framework with exogenous entry, the
folk theorem of perfect competition holds, in the sense that the set of limit
equilibrium prices contains the perfectly competitive price(s), and no other
price(s).3
This problem has been examined earlier by Novshek and Roy Chowdhury
(2003), though only for the case when the demand function is negatively
sloped and the average cost function is either ‘U-shaped’,4 or increasing.5
1The assumption that ﬁrms supply all demand is appropriate when the costs of turning
away customers are very high (see Dixon (1990), or Vives (1999)). Such costs may arise
because of either reputational reasons, or governmental regulations. Vives (1999) argues
that such regulations are operative in U.S. industries like electricity and telephone. This
assumption can, in fact, be traced back to Chamberlin (1933). It has also been adopted,
among others, by authors like Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985), Dastidar (1995),
Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), and Vives (1990, 1999).
2Alternatively, one can examine the limiting outcome under ‘free entry’ Bertrand equi-
librium as ﬁrms become small compared to the market. This notion was ﬁrst intro-
duced, for the Cournot case, in Novshek (1980). The limit-equilibrium set under free-entry
Bertrand competition was characterized by Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003).
3While the folk theorem is relatively well explored in the Cournot framework, (see,
among others, Novshek (1980), Okuguchi (1973) and Ruﬃn (1971)), it is much less so in
the Bertrand framework.
4Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) deﬁne an average cost function to be ‘U-shaped’
if there exists q
∗ > 0 such that the average cost function is strictly decreasing for all
0 < q < q
∗, and strictly increasing for all q > q
∗.
5Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003), of course, also examine the case when entry
is ‘free’, rather than ‘exogenous’. They also characterize the limit equilibrium set when
average costs are constant, or decreasing, or have a capacity constraint.
1They characterize the limit-equilibrium set for both classes of average cost
functions. Surprisingly, the folk theorem of perfect competition fails, in
the sense that the set of limit equilibrium prices either do not contain the
perfectly competitive price, or contains other prices as well.
The assumptions on the demand and the cost functions imposed by
Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) are certainly quite reasonable. Given
the importance of their results, however, it is of interest to re-examine the
problem under a minimal set of restrictions on the demand and the cost
functions. Hence in this paper we essentially only assume that the de-
mand function is continuous and intersects both the axes, and that the cost
function is continuous.6 In particular, we do not assume that the demand
function is negatively sloped, or that the average cost function is either
increasing, or ‘U-shaped’.
We characterize the limit-equilibrium set and show that, under a rela-
tively mild set of assumptions, our characterization coincides with that by
Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003). We also show that unless average cost
is constant, the folk theorem of perfect competition necessarily fails. Thus
this paper generalizes the Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) results for
the exogenous entry case to a signiﬁcant extent.
2 The Model
The market M(n) comprises the demand function f(p) and n ﬁrms, all
producing a single homogeneous good, and having the same cost function,
c(q).7
The market demand function f(p) satisﬁes the following assumption.
6Except possibly at the origin.
7For ease of comparison, the notations in this paper closely follow those in Novshek
and Roy Chowdhury (2003).
2Assumption 1: (a) f : [0,∞) → [0,∞).8 Moreover, f(p) is continuous.
(b) There exists a strictly positive ˆ p such that f(p) = 0, ∀p ≥ ˆ p and
f(p) > 0, ∀p < ˆ p.
Note that we do not assume that the demand function is necessarily
negatively sloped.
Let AC(q) denote the common average cost function of all ﬁrms.
Assumption 2: (a) c : [0,∞) → [0,∞). Moreover, c(0) = 0 and
c(q) > 0, ∀q > 0.
(b) The cost function is continuous, except possibly at the origin.9
(c) AC : (0,∞) → (0,∞). Moreover, there exists p such that p >
AC(f(p)).
Note that we do not assume that the average cost function is necessarily
either increasing, or ‘U-shaped’.10
We examine a game of Bertrand competition where the ﬁrms simultane-
ously announce their prices. Moreover, the ﬁrms supply all demand.






0, if pi > pj, for some j,
f(pi)
m , if pi ≤ pj, ∀j, and #(l : pl = pi) = m.
Thus the lowest priced ﬁrms share the market equally, while ﬁrms charg-
ing higher prices have zero demand.
The proﬁt of the i-th ﬁrm
8Note that this implies that f(0) is ﬁnite.
9Note that AC(q) is well deﬁned and continuous on (0,∞).
10The second part of Assumption 2(c) implies that the optimal monopoly proﬁt is
strictly positive. It is equivalent to the Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) assumption





0, if pi > pj, for some j,
(pi − AC(Di(p1,···,pn)))Di(p1,···,pn),if pi ≤ pj,∀j.
We solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices, i.e. Bertrand
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition. A Bertrand equilibrium for the market M(n) consists of a




We then deﬁne the notion of a limit-equilibrium set. In the quantity
competition framework, Ruﬃn (1971) and Okuguchi (1973), among others,
examine the Cournot-Nash equilibrium taking market conditions, in partic-
ular the number of active ﬁrms, as exogenously given. They then study the
limiting outcome as the number of active ﬁrms goes to inﬁnity. We call this
the exogenous entry approach.
Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) adapt this notion to the Bertrand
context. In a Bertrand framework ﬁrms are active when they charge the
minimum price. Hence Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) characterize
the set of all prices p such that if the number of ﬁrms n is large enough,
then, for the market M(n), there is some equilibrium where all ﬁrms are
active and the equilibrium price is arbitrarily close to p. This notion of a
limit equilibrium set is adopted in the present paper as well.
Deﬁnition: S = {p : there is a sequence p(n) that converges to p
such that, for each suﬃciently large n, all ﬁrms setting a price p(n) is an
equilibrium for the market M(n)}.
We need some more notations before we can characterize S.
b = limq→0 AC(q).11
11From Assumption 2(c), b is well deﬁned (allowing for inﬁnity as a possible limit).
4c∗ = infq AC(q).12
˜ p = argmaxp∈[0,ˆ p] f(p).13
˜ d = inf {p : p > AC(f(p))}.14
d is the minimum p such that AC(f(p)) = p.15
We then impose the following regularity condition.
Assumption 3. If b = ˜ d, then the cost function is either linear, or there
exists t > 0 such that AC(q) is negatively sloped for all q ∈ (0,t).
Note that generically b 6= ˜ d.16 Thus Assumption 3 is not very strong.
Recall that in the Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) framework, b = ˜ d
implies that the average cost function is ‘U-shaped’, so that Assumption 3
is necessarily satisﬁed. In Remark 2, Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003)
also consider the case where average cost is constant (so that b = ˜ d).
Proposition 1 below characterizes the set S.
Proposition 1. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold. Then S = [b, ˜ d] if
b ≤ ˜ d, it is empty otherwise.
Proof: To begin with we argue that no price less than b or greater than
˜ d can belong in the limit set S.
Suppose that p(n) converges to p as n increases and for each suﬃciently
large n, all n ﬁrms setting a price p(n) is an equilibrium for M(n). Note
that the output per active ﬁrm is at most
f(˜ p)
n , which converges to zero
12Given Assumption 2(c), c
∗ is ﬁnite.
13Given that f(p) is continuous, ˜ p is well deﬁned.
14Since p = 0 is a lower bound, there is a least upper bound. Given Assumption 2(c),
the set {p : p > AC(f(p))} is non-empty. Hence ˜ d is ﬁnite.
15Given Assumption 2(c), d is well deﬁned.
16This is in the following sense. Take any pair of f(p) and AC(q) such that b = ˜ d. Now
if either one of the functions is perturbed slightly (in an appropriate manner), then it will
no longer be the case that b = ˜ d.
5as n goes to inﬁnity.17 Thus if p < b, then for all suﬃciently large n,
p(n) < AC(
f(p(n))
n ), so that p(n) cannot be an equilibrium price.





n , is less than (ˆ p − c∗)
f(˜ p)
n . Thus, for n large, proﬁt per
active ﬁrm converges to zero. Moreover, from the deﬁnition of ˜ d, there exists
p0 such that ˜ d < p0 < p(n) and p0 > AC(f(p0)). Undercutting to such a price
p0 yields a strictly positive proﬁt that depends on p0, but not on n. Thus,
for n large, undercutting is strictly proﬁtable.
We then argue that every price in the interval [b, ˜ d] is in the limit set. If
p > b, then, for any suﬃciently large n, if n ﬁrms set such a price then each
ﬁrm will produce an output at which p exceeds average cost, and thus obtain
a positive proﬁt. Undercutting is unproﬁtable since for any p strictly less
than ˜ d, an undercutting ﬁrm cannot make a positive proﬁt as p ≤ AC(f(P)).
The remaining case is p = b. If b < ˜ d, then this p can be obtained as
the limit of an appropriate sequence of equilibrium prices, p(n), described
above.
Finally, let b = ˜ d < ˆ p.18 If average cost is constant, then p = b can be
sustained as a Bertrand equilibrium for all n. Hence, given Assumption 3,
we assume that there exists t > 0 such that AC(q) is negatively sloped for
all q ∈ (0,t).
Consider some p ∈ (AC(t),b). Let q(p) be the unique q, 0 < q < t,
such that AC(q(p)) = p. Next, let n(p) satisfy
f(p)
n(p) = q(p), where n(p) can
be a non-integer. Given that f(b) > 0 and limp↑b q(p) = 0, it follows that
limp↑b n(p) = ∞. Next, let ˜ n(p) be the largest possible integer such that
p ≥ AC(
f(p)
n ) (this is well deﬁned for n(p) large enough). Clearly, there
exists some largest interval (b0,b), AC(t) ≤ b0 < b, such that ˜ n(p) is well
17Note that the assumption that the demand function intersects both axes ensures that
˜ p is well deﬁned, and thus f(˜ p) is bounded.
18Since f(p) is negatively sloped at ˆ p, it cannot be the case that b = ˜ d > ˆ p. If b = ˜ d = ˆ p,
then all ﬁrms charging ˆ p and having zero demand and supply is an equilibrium for M(n).
6deﬁned for all p ∈ (b0,b). Given that |n(p)− ˜ n(p)| < 1 and limp↑b n(p) = ∞,
we have that limp↑b ˜ n(p) = ∞. Let ˆ n = minp∈(b0,b) ˜ n(p).
We then construct a sequence < p(n) > such that ∀i ∈ {0,1,2,...},
p(ˆ n + i) is some p ∈ (b0,b) such that ˆ n + i = ˜ n(p). Note that for n ≥ ˆ n, the
pair (n,p(n)) belongs to the graph of ˜ n(p). Thus p(n) ≥ AC(
f(p(n))
n ), so that
all ﬁrms earn non-negative proﬁts. Moreover, since p(n) < b = ˜ d, no ﬁrm can
undercut proﬁtably. Finally, we argue that the sequence < p(n) > converges
to b. Suppose not. Then there exists some  > 0 and some sub-sequence





ni = 0. Hence, for ni large enough, p(ni) < AC(
f(ni)
ni ). This,
however, is a contradiction since for all ni, (ni,p(ni)) belongs to the graph of
˜ n(p).
We then relate the above characterization to the corresponding one in
Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) (i.e. Theorem 1). For the case when
the demand function is negatively sloped, and the average cost function is
either increasing, or ‘U-shaped’, they ﬁnd that if b ≤ d, then S = [b,d]. S is
empty otherwise.
Under the Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) framework it is easy to
see that if b ≤ ˜ d, then ˜ d = d,19 so that the two characterizations coincide.
We then argue that there is a large class of demand and cost functions for
which the above result goes through.
We begin by introducing the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition. f(p) is said to be tangent to AC(q) at some p, if p =
AC(f(p)) and there is some  > 0 such that for all p ∈ (p−,p)∪(p,p+),
either p ≥ AC(f(p)), or p ≤ AC(f(p)).
19If b ≤ ˜ d, then, under the Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003) formulation, the average
cost function must be positively sloped at ˜ d. Thus there does not exist any p
0 < ˜ d such
that p
0 = AC(f(p
0)). Of course if b > ˜ d, then S is empty.
7We need one ﬁnal assumption.
Assumption 4. At any p < ˜ d such that p = AC(f(p)), the demand
and the average cost functions cannot be tangent to each other.
Clearly, Assumption 4 is generically true,20 and is not a very strong
assumption.
We are now in a position to prove Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold. Then S = [b,d] if
b ≤ d, S is empty otherwise.
Proof. Given Proposition 1, it is suﬃcient to show that, under Assump-
tion 4, ˜ d = d.
Clearly, ˜ d = AC(f(˜ d)). Since d is the minimum p such that p =
AC(f(p)), ˜ d ≥ d. Next suppose that ˜ d > d. By deﬁnition, d = AC(f(d)).
Moreover, from the deﬁnition of ˜ d, p ≤ AC(f(p)) for all p ∈ [0, ˜ d). Hence
f(p) and AC(q) are tangent to each other at d. This, however, violates
Assumption 4.
We ﬁnally examine whether, in this framework, the folk theorem of per-
fect competition holds or not. Clearly, the folk theorem holds if and only if
b = ˜ d = c∗. Given Assumption 3, b = ˜ d = c∗ if and only if average cost is
constant. For all other classes of cost functions the folk theorem fails.
3 Conclusion
We examine the limit-properties of Bertrand price competition when entry
is exogenous. Our results substantially generalize those in Novshek and
Roy Chowdhury (2003) since we allow for demand functions that are not
necessarily decreasing, and for average cost functions that are not necessarily
20In the sense of footnote 16.
8either increasing, or ‘U-shaped’. We also demonstrate that, under a set
of relatively mild conditions, the characterization developed in this paper
coincides with that in Novshek and Roy Chowdhury (2003). Finally, we
show that the folk theorem of perfect competition fails for all classes of cost
functions, except for the case when average cost is constant.
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